**r'      ,- 


REVIEW 


OF 


T.    L.    MCKENNEY'S    NARRATIVE 


OF    THE 


CAUSES  WHICH,  IN  1814,  LED  TO 

GENERAL    ARMSTRONG'S 

RESIGNATION   OF    THE    WAR    OFFICE. 


BY 


KOSCIUSZKO  ARMSTRONG. 
\\ 


NEW  YORK : 

R.  CRAIGHEAD,  PRINTER,  112  FULTON  STREET 

1846. 


W3/I7 


REVIEW  OF  T.   L.   MCKENNEY'S    NARRATIVE,   &c. 


MY  attention  has  lately  been  called  to  a  work  published  by 
Thomas  L.  McKenney,  which,  though  chiefly  devoted  to  a  de 
fence  of  his  official  conduct  as  Superintendent  of  Indian  Affairs, 
contains,  dove-tailed  among  its  chapters,  one  of  political  remi 
niscence,  evidently  intended  as  an  attack  on  the  late  General  Arm 
strong. 

Having  been  for  some  time  engaged  in  arranging  the  General's 
correspondence,  and  preparing  a  sketch  of  his  life,  with  a  view  to 
publication,  my  first  determination  was,  to  leave  Mr.  McKenney's 
misrepresentations  uncorrected,  until  such  time  as  my  work 
should  be  ready  for  the  press.  Circumstances,  however,  beyond 
my  control  will,  probably,  delay  its  appearance  for  some  months  ; 
and  I  have  thought  it  well  in  the  meanwhile, to  give  to  the  offensive 
chapter,  the  notice  it  deserves.  The  following  extract  from  Mr. 
McKenney's  book  will  place  the  subject  at  once  before  the  reader. 

"During- the  late  war  with  Great  Britain,  or  the  greater  part  of  it,  as  is 
known  to  everybody,  Mr.  Monroe  was  Secretary  of  State,  and  General  Arm 
strong1,  Secretary  of  War;  it  is  known  also  that  soon  after  the  capture  of 
Washington  and  the  conflagration  of  its  Capitol,  General  Armstrong  was  su 
perseded  in  the  office  of  Secretary  of  War  by  Mr.  Monroe.  It  was  soon 
whispered  that  this  change  had  been  produced  by  the  undermining  agency  of 
Mr.  Monroe.  Whence  the  rumor  came,  or  by  whom  it  was  originated,  no  one 
knew,  but  it  remained  a  source  of  deep  disquiet  to  harass  Mr.  Monroe  to  the 
hour  of  his  death." 

How  far  the  Secretary  of  State  was  implicated  in  the  intrigue 
so  successfully  employed  to  produce  his  colleague's  resignation 
of  the  War  office,  cannot  now  be  ascertained.  He  was  sus 
pected  of  being  "  art  and  part  "  in  this  dirty  business,  on  the  well 
established  principle,  that  he  who  profits  by  the  crime  is  most 
likely  to  be  the  criminal  ;  and  the  death  bed  scene  so  graphically 
sketched  by  his  friend  and  follower,  shows,  that  Mr.  Monroe 
knew  that  he  labored  under  such  suspicion,  and  felt  disquieted  by 
it  to  his  last  hour.  Is  it  not  extraordinary,  that  a  mere  "rumor," 
as  McKenney  characterizes  the  charge,  should  have  so  impressed 
the  mind  of  the  Ex-President,  that  fifteen  years  after  the  event 
that  gave  it  birth,  it  continued  to  be  a  source  of  secret,  corroding 
thought  ?  One  more  disposed  than  I  am  to  form  uncharitable 
conclusions,  might  see  in  this  continued  apprehension,  strong  evi 
dence  of  the  working  of  a  conscience  ill  at  ease. 


4 

My  business,  however,  is  not  with  the  dead  Monroe,  but  the 
living  McKcnncy,  who,  under  pretence  of  salving  over  the 
reputation  of  his  maker  and  master,  has  thought  proper  to  lend 
the  weight  of  his  evidence  (such  as  it  is)  to  the  old  calumny,  that 
General  Armstrong's  neglect  of  duty  led  to  the  capture  of  Wash 
ington.  Before  I  proceed  to  comment  on  the  testimony,  it  may 
not  be  amiss  to  say  a  few  words  of  the  witness.  He  was  the 
leading  member  of  the  famous,  or  infamous  Georgetown-mob 
Committee,  who  waited  on  the  President  in  1814  to  demand 
General  Armstrong's  removal  from  office.  He  stands  therefore 
before  the  public  in  a  doubtful  position, — denying  the  existence 
of  a  plot  of  which  he  was  himself  one  of  the  most  active  and 
unscrupulous  agents,  and  offering  his  own  naked  assertion  as 
proof  of  his  innocence,  and  of  that  of  him  who  was  suspected, 
(perhaps  erroneously)  of  being  his  employer.  Mr.  McKenney 
seems  not  yet  to  understand,  that  the  man  who  thus  comes  for 
ward  as  a  witness  in  his  own  cause,  should  either  possess  a  charac 
ter  for  truth,  placing  him  above  the  suspicion  of  corrupt  motives, 
or  else,  is  bound  to  furnish  such  additional  evidence  derived  from 
other  sources,  as  may  make  his  story  credible.  Not  even  this 
gentleman's  vanity  can  lead  him  to  believe  that  he  stands  in  the 
first  named  category,  and  it  shall  be  my  business  to  show,  how 
impossible  it  is  for  him  to  fulfil  the  conditions,  required  by  the 
last. 

Knowing  the  value  of  scenic  effect,  Mr.  McKenney  enters  on 
his  subject  with  dramatic  skill.  The  reader  is  brought  to  the 
bedside  of  the  age-worn  Ex-President,  whose  thin  features, 
emaciated  form  and  church-yard  cough  sufficiently  indicate,  that 
he  is  about  passing  from  time  to  eternity.  With  a  voice  weak 
ened  by  emotion  or  disease,  he  alludes  to  the  existing  suspicion, 
that  he  had  been  instrumental  in  producing  "  General  Arm 
strong's  separation  from  the  War  Department" — solemnly  pro 
tests  his  innocence,  and  beseeches  his  friend  and  follower  to  nar 
rate  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  Thus  abjured,  the  pious 
Thomas  begins : 

"  My  intercourse  was  frequent  with  General  Armstrong,  beginning  with  the 
arrival  of  the  British  forces  in  the  Chesapeake.  It  was  made  my  duty  to  re 
port  to  him  the  arrival  of  troops,  and  their  wants  in  equipments,  &c.  •  He  ap 
peared  to  me  to  doubt  the  intentions  of  the  enemy  to  invade  the  Capitol ;  and 
under  the  influence  of  this  belief,  in  which  I  have  no  doubt  he  was  sincere,  I 
found  some  difficulty  in  procuring  the  necessary  arms,  &c.,  for  troops  as  they 
came  in." 

The  narrator  shared,  I  believe,  in  the  danger  and  glory  of  this 
brilliant  campaign,  as  volunteer  aid  of  General  Smith,  of  the 
Georgetown  militia.  He  does  not  tell  us  how  it  became  his 
peculiar  duty  to  report  the  arrival  of  troops,  or  to  procure  arms 


for  men  not  belonging  to  the  brigade  to  which  he  was  attached. 
I  arn  therefore  at  liberty  to  suppose,  that  as  officers  of  the  regular 
army  were  on  the  spot  whose  business  it  really  was  to  attend  to 
the  wants  of  the  soldiery,  Mr.  McKermey's  applications,  if  he 
made  any,  were  regarded  at  the  War  office  as  the  impudent  in 
terference  of  a  meddler  who  trespassed  beyond  the  line  of  his 
duty.  Taking  this  view  of  the  subject,  it  is  not  surprising,  that 
he  found  some  difficulty  in  procuring  arms,  &c.  But  how  was 
it,  that  when  the  Committee  of  Investigation  were  in  session,  not 
a  syllable  was  heard  from  him  of  these  difficulties  ?  How  hap 
pened  it  that  a  fact  bearing  materially  on  the  subject  of  inquiry, 
should  have  been  carefully  concealed  when  its  revelation  was  so 
important  ?  How  came  it,  that  at  a  moment  when  the  crimina 
tion  and  condemnation  of  General  Armstrong  by  a  Committee  of 
Congress,  were  events  which,  if  purchaseable,  the  Government 
would  have  bought  at  almost  any  price, — this  willing  witness, 
should  not  have  been  forthcoming?  These  questions  admit 
but  of  two  answers  :  either  the  alleged  difficulties  could  not 
justly  be  attributed  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  or  were  of  a  nature 
so  frivolous,  as  to  take  from  them  all  importance.  I  proceed  to 
the  next  paragraph. 

"After  Commodore  Barney  had  been  forced  to  blow  up  his  flotilla  in  the  Pa>- 
tuxent,  and  our  troops  being  at  the  Battalion  Old  Fields,  and  I  had  come  in  as 
a  vidette,  having  rode  along  th?  enemy's  flanks  for  over  a  rnile,  and  picking  up 
on  my  return  to  camp  two  British  deserters  whom  I  brought  in  with  me,  I 
found  on  horseback  in  our  camp.  President  Madison,  General  Armstrong,  and 
two  or  three  persons,  to  whom  in  presence  of  the  commanding  General,  I 
stated  the  position  of  the  enemy  and  what  appeared  to  be  their  numbers,  and 
gave  it  as  my  opinion  that  they  would  be  at  our  encampment  before  daylight 
next  morning.  To  which  General  Armstrong  replied. — "  They  can  have  no 
such  intention.  They  are  foraging,  I  suppose,  and  if  an  attack  Is  meditated  by 
them  upon  any  place,  it  is  Annapolis." 

The  reader  will  observe,  that  the  above  story  has  some  of  the 
characteristics  of  truth ;  it  is  told  with  minuteness,  and  with  the 
confidence  of  a  narrator  apparently  having  no  cause  to  distrust 
the  accuracy  of  his  recollection.  The  object  is,  doubtless,  to 
show  that  as  late  as  the  23d  of  August,  the  day  preceding  the 
battle  of  Bladensburg,  General  Armstrong  had  no  faith  in  the 
meditated  attack  on  Washington,  but  believed,  that  Annapolis 
was  the  object  of  the  British  invasion,  if,  indeed,  that  invasion  had 
any  object  at  all*  As  no  witness  of  this  pretended  conversa- 

*  I  might  point  to  the  absurdity  of  this  opinion,  as  in  itself  conclusive,  that 
neither  General  Armstrong  nor  any  other  man  could  have  expressed  it. 
Mr.  McKenney's  zeal  or  malignity  outran  his  discretion ;  acting  on  the 
parasitical  principle  that,  "  who  peppers  the  highest  is  surest  to  please," 
and  discovering  with  the  unerring  instinct  of  toadyism,  the  hopes  and  wishes  of 
his  sick  patron,  he  made  General  Armstrong  not  only  express  an  utter  disbelief  of 
the  enemy's  intention  of  moving  upon  Washington,  but  a  doubt  whether  the  Bri 
tish  invasion  had  any  object  whatever. 


tion,  other  than  the  narrator  is  now  in  existence,  Mr.  McKenney 
may  have  thought  himself  secure  against  the  risk  of  detection  : 
it  will  be  for  me  to  show  his  mistake,  and  make  the  dead  speak 
to  his  shame  and  confusion. 

I  am  willing  to  admit,  that  in  the  early  stage  of  the  campaign 
when  the  British  force  was  so  placed  as  equally  to  menace  three 
points — Baltimore,  Annapolis,  and  Washington  ;  and  when  its 
movements  were  not  yet  sufficiently  decided  to  indicate  a  prefer 
ence  for  one  of  the  three,  General  Armstrong  was  of  opinion, 
that  the  most  important  and  most  vulnerable  of  these  would  pro 
bably  be  selected  by  the  enemy.  But.  even  as  early  as  the  19th 
of  August,  the  Secretary  of  War's  belief  appears  to  have  been 
modified,  since  in  a  letter  of  that  date  he  advises  the  Com 
mander-in-chief — "  if  the  enemy's  movements  indicate  an  at 
tack  on  Washington,  to  push  forward  his  cavalry  without  delay, 
remove  cattle,  horses,"  &c.  Again  :  on  the  22d  of  August,  he 
counselled  him  verbally  and  by  letter,  "  to  throw  a  corps  on  the 
enemy's  flank,  and  by  such  demonstration,  prevent  his  advance 
towards  Washington."*  On  the  night  of  this  day  he  reached  the 
camp  at  Battalion  Old  Fields  in  company  with  the  President,  and 
now  it  is  that  I  will  produce  the  evidence  which  I  intend  to  op 
pose  to  that  of  Mr.  McKenney  ;  the  reader  will  easily  deter 
mine  which  is  most  worthy  of  credit.  I  must  premise  that, 
since  the  parties  to  this  pretended  conversation  are  all  dead, 
but  one,  it  is  not  possible  for  me  to  find  any  testimony 
directly  contradicting  that  which  he  offers.  The  most  which 
can  be  done  or  required,  is  to  furnish  a  chain  of  evidence  suffi 
ciently  strong  to  support  the  inference,  that  the  witness  has  mis 
represented  what  passed,  and  that  the  opinions  which  he  as 
sumes  to  have  heard,  are  such  as  could  not  have  been  expressed. 

It  has  been  seen,  that  on  the  22d  of  August,  General  Armstrong 
believed  in  the  possibility  of  an  attack  on  Washington,  since  the 
written  advice  which  he  then  offered  to  Winder  was  calculated 
to  meet  such  an  emergency.  That  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
23d  his  opinion  was  unchanged,  is  shown  by  Colonel  Allan 
McClane,  who  states  in  his  account  of  the  occurrences  of  the 
campaign,  that  the  Secretary  of  War,  at  the  council  held  at  the 


*  Report  of  Committee  of  Investigation,  pp.  116,  126.— Again,  on  the  19th  of 
August,  General  Armstrong  thus  gave  his  opinion  in  a  note  to  the  President  on  the 
question  whether  the  flotilla  should  be  blown  up  without  fighting:.  "  It  may  be  asked, 
what  will  be  the  effect  of  destroying  the  flotilla  without  a  contest  ?  Will  it  not 
invite  to  further  aggression,  Jl  soldier's  objects  enlarge  and  multiply  with  his 
good  fortune.  _  Under  this  view  of  the  subject  my  opinion  is,  that  unless  Barnev's 
position  be  decidedly  indefensible,  it  ought  to  he  held,  and  to  Barney  alone  should 
be  left  the  question  of  its  tenability."  The  reply  was,  that  Barney  had  his  orders, 
and  these  orders  of  President  Madison  were  for 'the  immediate  destruction  of  the 
flotilla  !  Had  Barney  been  left  to  defend  the  position,  as  he  wished  to  do  and 
could  have  done,  who  can  believe  that  Ross  would  have  ventured  further  ? 


President's  quarters  in  camp,  recommended  to  General  Winder 
the  occupation  of  the  Capitol,  and  adjacent  buildings,  as  offering 
the  best  means  of  defence  for  the  city.*  And  lastly,  that  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  same  day  the  War-minister's  opinion  remained 
what  it  had  been  in  th?  morning,  is  proved  by  the  direct  evi 
dence  of  a  witness  now  living,  Mr.  Jacob  Barker,  who,  after 
describing  the  disorder  and  confusion  of  Winder's  army  at  Bat 
talion  Old  Fields,  speaks  in  the  following  words :  "  The  Presi 
dent  and  Secretary  returned  to  Washington  convinced,  that  if 
the  enemy  marched  on  the  city,  they  would  have  an  easy  con 
quest.  /  was  that  evening  present,  and  heard  General  Armstrong 
make  this  statement  to  George  W.  Campbell,  then  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  and  to  William  Jones,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
These  high  functionaries  replied  to  the  Secretary — "  Why  do 
you  not  take  command  of  the  army  yourself,  and  defend  the 
city  ?"  His  answer  was,  "  I  have  no  right  to  do  so — my  duties 
are,  by  law,  confined  to  my  chamber."f  I  believe  the  foregoing 
testimony  is  sufficiently  full,  on  the  subject  of  the  opinions  held  by 
General  Armstrong,  relative  to  the  object  of  the  British  move 
ment,  to  shut  out,  I  will  not  say  the  probability  only,  but  the 
possibility  of  his  having  made  the  assertion  ascribed  to  him  by 
Mr.  McKenney  :  yet,  this  is  not  all.  I  am  enabled  to  offer  to  the 
reader  the  following  strong  presumptive  proof  of  the  falsity  of 
our  authors  statement,  derived  from  a  letter  of  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  to  Commodore  Rodgers,  and  from  General  Winder's 
narrative. 

The  letter,  evidently  written  to  give  effect  to  a  resolution 
adopted  in  the  Camp  Council,  is  dated  "  Battalion  Old  Fields,  8£ 
o'clock,  August  23d,"  and  contains  the  following  passage  :  "  I 
have  now  to  direct,  that  with  the  utmost  possible  celerity,  you 
will  move  on  with  the  seamen  and  marines  under  your  command 
to  Bladensburg,  and  endeavor  to  have  as  early  communication  as 
possible  with  General  Winder."  "  The  President  and  Heads  of 
Departments  are  now  in  this  camp.  The  enemy  were  last  night 
at  Upper  Marl  borough,  from  which  it  is  probable  they  will  ad 
vance  to-day  towards  Bladensburg."  Now,  is  it  at  all  credible, 
that  General  Armstrong,  having  at  8  o'clock  in  the  morning,  made 
part  of  a  Council  who  thought  the  enemy's  movements  so  mena- 


*  Notices  of  the  War,  Appendix,  p.  235. 

t  Letter  to  the  editor  of  Commercial  Advertiser,  May,  1843.  For  a  confirma 
tion  of  the  material  facts  in  Mr.  Barker's  statement,  see  G.  W.  Campbell's  letter 
to  the  Committee  of  Investigation,  p.  7.  If  the  Secretary  had  felt  any  disposition 
to  transcend  his  authority,  and  give  orders  instead  of  advice,  he  would  have  been 
effectually  precluded  from  doing  so,  by  the  operation  of  a  rule,  served  on  him  by 
the  President  on  the  13th  of  August,  expressly  forbidding  him  from  "  issuing  any 
military  order,  having  for  its  object  the  movement  of  troops,  without  Mr.  Madi~ 
son's  sanction." 


cing  to  Washington,  as  to  require  the  hurried  march  ofRodgers's 
seamen,  should,  at  10  o'clock  (the  hour  of  the  review  of  troops), 
have  ventured  the  positive  assertion  in  the  presence  of  the  Presi 
dent,  Commanding  General  and  Naval  Secretary,  that  "  if  the 
enemy  had  any  object  of  attack,  it  was  Annapolis?"  Thus  con 
demning,  as  worse  than  useless,  the  measures  he  had  concurred 
in  but  two  hours  before  ! 

Again :  If  McKenney's  story  be  true,  how  shall  we  account 
for  the  fact,  that  General  Winder,  in  his  minute  narrative  of  the 
events  preceding  the  affair  of  Bladensburg,  should  say  nothing 
of  the  consultation  held  in  the  saddle,  to  which  the  President  and 
Secretary  of  War  are  alleged  to  have  been  parties  ?  He  con 
firms  McClane's  statement  as  far  as  relates  to  the  early  visit 
which  he  paid  to  Mr.  Madison  and  the  War-Minister  for  the  pur 
poses  of  report  and  counsel ;  he  speaks  of  two  prisoners  "  taken 
in  a  dexterous  way  by  Captain  Herbert,"  the  result  of  whose  ex 
amination  led  him  to  believe,  that  the  British  army  would  make 
no  movement  that  day  from  Marlborough  ;  he  mentions  a  variety 
of  conflicting  reports  by  men  who  saw  or  pretended  to  have  seen 
the  enemy, — but  not  a  word  of  McKenney's  reconnoitring  ex 
ploits,  or  of  the  deserters  he  brought  in.  It  is  a  fact,  too,  abun 
dantly  shown  by  the  same  official  narrative,  that  General  Winder, 
at  this  time,  leant  to  the  opinion  that  Annapolis  might  be  the 
enemy's  object  ;*  yet,  though  sufficiently  diffuse  in  stating  the 
reasons  of  this  creed,  he  makes  no  allusion  to  the  similar  belief, 
asserted  to  have  been  avowed  in  his  presence,  by  the  Secretary 
of  War, — an  omission  the  more  extraordinary,  as  this  belief,  had 
it  found  utterance,  would  have  been,  in  some  measure,  a  justifi 
cation  of  Winder's.  The  conclusion  is  obvious,  the  Commanding 
General  makes  no  mention  of  the  Secretary's  opinion,  respecting 
the  danger  of  an  attack  on  Annapolis,  because  that  opinion  was 
never  given. 

"  While  engaged  in  the  duty  of  throwing  up  batteries  on  the  shore  of  the 
Potomac,  at  the  foot  of  Wind  Mill  Hill,  General  Armstrong,  of  whom  we  had 
heard  nothing  after  the  evening  of  the  interview  at  the  Old  Fields,  rode  on  the 
ground.  The  impression  had  become  universal  that,  as  Secretary  of  War,  he 
had  neglected  to  prepare  the  necessary  defences  ;  and  that  owing  to  this 
neglect  the  capital  had  been  desecrated,  and  the  glory  of  our  arms  tarnished. 


*  See  Report  of  the  Committee  of  Investigation,  p.  156,  Winder's  Narrative.  The 
General  thought  that  Annapolis  might  be  chosen  as  an  object  of  attack — because  it 
presented  to  the  enemy  a  fine  port, — comfortable  quarters, — stores  and  store-houses, 
and  might  with  little  difficulty  be  made  almost  impregnable  to  a  land  attack.  These 
were  good  substantial  reasons  at  one  period  of  the  campaign,  but  when  the  enemy 
had  passed  Marlborough,  there  was  no  longer  much  cause  to  believe,  that  he 
would  strike  at  Annapolis. 


9 

Indeed,  many  went  further,  openly  and  loudly.  Charles  Carrol,  of  Bellevue, 
the  moment  General  Armstrong  rode  upon  the  ground,  met  him  and  denounced 
him  openly  and  vehemently,  as  the  cause  of  all  the  disasters  that  had  befallen 
the  city,  when,  with  one  impulse,  the  officers  said  to  General  Smith — «  There, 
sir,  are  our  swords;  we  will  not  employ  them  if  General  Armstrong  is  to 
command  us,  in  his  capacity  of  Secretary  of  War;  but  we  will  obey  the  orders 
of  any  other  member  of  the  Cabinet.'  At  the  same  moment  the  men  at  the 
batteries  threw  down  their  spades,  avowing  a  like  resolve. 

"General  Smith  called  me  to  him,  saying, — *  You  see  the  state  of  things;  I 
have  just  ordered  Major  Williams  to  report  it  to  the  President,  that  under  the 
orders  of  any  other  member  of  the  Cabinet,  what  can  be  done  will  be  done.' 
We  rode  off  in  haste,  and  overtook  President  Madison,  Richard  Rush  (I  be 
lieve),  and  a  third  person  on  F  street,  in  Washington,  on  horseback — the 
Government  having  been  again  organized  at  Washington.  The  message  de 
livered  to  President  Madison  was  in  accordance  with  the  above  to  the  letter, — 
the  last  sentence — '  But  under  any  other  member  of  the  Cabinet,  the  most  cheer 
ful  duty  will  be  rendered.'  The  answer  by  the  President  was, — '  Say  to  General 
Smith,  the  contingency  (namely  that  of  any  future  orders  being  given  by  Gene 
ral  Armstrong)  shall  not  happen..'  " 

Imagination  and  memory  are  so  blended  in  our  author,  that  it 
is  impossible  to  say  where  the  operations  of  the  one  cease,  or  of 
the  other  begin.  It  is  not  easy,  at  this  late  date,  to  ascertain 
whether  or  no  General  Armstrong  ever  was  at  Wind  Mill  Hill,  as 
Mr.  McKenney  asserts  ; — but,  in  default  of  positive  testimony, 
there  is  enough  of  moral  evidence  to  show,  that  the  tale  of  Car 
rol's  open  denunciation  is  a  miserable  fiction.  In  no  contempo 
rary  record,  and  I  have  searched  many,  have  I  found  any  allusion 
to  this  event.  Now,  let  the  reader  for  a  moment  look  back  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  times, — to  the  violence  of  the  press,  and  the 
rancor  of  party  spirit, — and  ask  himself  how  it  could  happen,  that 
General  Armstrong's  personal  and  political  enemies,  so  nume 
rous  and  active,  should  not  have  found  a  subject  of  loud  exultation 
in  this  story  of  Carrol's  unrebuked  insolence?  Wilkinson,  too, 
who  will  certainly  not  be  suspected  of  a  disposition  to  favor  the 
War-minister,  or  hide  any  circumstance  tending  to  his  discredit, 
was  then  living  at  Washington,  in  habits  of  close  intimacy  with 
Carrol — the  frequent  companion  of  his  board  and  bottle  ;  yet,  his 
Memoirs  (otherwise  so  calumnious)  are  silent  on  this  head,  and 
indeed,  so  far  from  attributing  to  General  Armstrong  any  dispo 
sition  to  submit  patiently  to  affronts,  he  represents,  him  with  equal 
injustice,  as  the  terror  of  Metropolitan  politicians.*  But  before  I 
offer  any  further  commentary  on  Mr.  McKenney's  statement,  it 
is  necessary  to  make  known  a  few  facts  to  the  reader,  by  the  light 
of  which  he  may  more  easily  discover  the  hidden  source  of  that 
"impulse"  which  led  the  chivalry  of  Georgetown  to  cast  away 
their  innocent  swords,  on  Wind  Mill  Hill. 


*  "  I  am  indeed  shocked  when  I  take  a  retrospect  of  the  evidence  of  the  terror 
in  which  that  minister  kept  more  than  one  great  man  at  Washington."— Wilkin 
son's  Memoirs,  vol.i.,  p.  762. 

2 


10 

After  the  defeat  of  the  American  army,  the  President  designat 
ed  Fredericktown  as  the  temporary  seat  of  the  Cabinet,  and 
thither  the  Secretaries  of  the  Treasury  and  of  War  went,  in  full 
faith,  that  Mr.  Madison  and  their  colleagues  would  follow.  The 
President,  however,  changed  his  mind  and  repaired,  after  Ross's 
retreat,  to  Washington,  where  General  Armstrong  did  not  join 
him  until  the  29th  of  August.  The  three  days  that  elapsed  pre 
vious  to  his  return,  were  employed  by  the  Georgetown  militia,  (as 
Mr.  McKenney  informs  us),  in  marching  and  counter-marching  on 
the  Baltimore  road,  and  throwing  up  batteries,  which  appear  to 
have  been  erected  on  the  wise  and  well  approved  principle  of 
"  shutting  the  stable  door  after  the  horse  had  been  stolen."  But, 
though  these  military  mummeries  furnished  employment  to  the 
mass,  there  were  a  select  few  who  turned  the  three  days  of  the 
Secretary's  absence,  to  a  more  personal  account.  A  committee, 
purporting  to  represent  the  citizens  of  the  district,  was  chosen  to 
wait  on  the  President,  and  demand  General  Armstrong's  removal 
from  office.  The  select  men  were  Messrs.  Hanson,  Bowie,  and 
McKenney ;  the  first  a  Federal  editor,  whom  the  spirit  of  party 
rancor  moved  to  this  action,  and  the  two  last,  warm,  personal 
friends  of  Mr.  Monroe,  whose  motives  may  be  as  easily  under 
stood.*  When  their  names  were  announced,  the  President  de 
clined  communicating  with  more  than  one  of  these  unwelcome 
visitors,  and  designated  Mr.  McKenney  as  the  least  obnoxious  of 
the  three.  With  him  he  was  closeted  for  upwards  of  an  hour, 
and  what  passed  between  them  is  known  only  by  report.  That 
at  this  time,  more  was  required  than  the  President  would  give  is 
certain  ;  and  McKenney  carried  back  to  his  coadjutors  the  news 
only  of  a  doubtful  success.  Even  this  step  had  been  gained  writh 
so  much  of  difficulty,  that  it  was  feared  the  President  might,  on 
further  reflection,  return  to  a  sense  of  what  was  due  to  himself 
and  his  minister,  particularly  if  that  minister  (whose  arrival  was 
hourly  expected)  was  allowed  time  for  his  defence. 

The  Committee  thereupon  determined  to  "  strike  whilst  the  iron 
was  red,"  and  to  assist  the  civil  movement  by  the  more  dangerous 
threat  of  military  revolt.  This,  at  once  and  clearly  accounts  for 
the  farce  got  up  upon  Wind  Mill  Hill.  Mr.  McKenney  returned 
to  Washington,  no  longer  the  representative  of  peaceful,  pudding- 
headed  burghers,  but  the  emissary  of  that  valorous  corps  whose 
rapid  movements  had  been  so  conspicuous  on  the  field  of  Bladens- 
burg,  and  a  new  cause  of  alarm  was  thus  presented  to  the  tremu 
lous  mind  of  the  worthy  Madison. 

It  was  to  be  expected,  that  a  temper  never  noted  for  its  firm- 


*  This  account  is  founded  on  information  contained  in  the  letters  of  a  resident  of 
Washington,  who  had  the  means  of  reaching  the  truth,  whatever  care  was  em 
ployed  to  hide  it.  It  is,  besides,  in  strict  conformity  with  the  public  impressions 
of  that  day. 


11 

ness,  should  yield  to  this  double  pressure ;  yet,  it  seems  that  the 
Committee,  fearful  of  losing  all  by  asking  too  much,  had  now 
limited  their  demands,  and  instructed  their  agent  to  require  only 
the  curtailment  of  the  Secretary's  authority  so  far  as  the  District 
of  Columbia  was  concerned.  Mr.  Madison  eagerly  availed  him 
self  of  this  middle  course;  and,  without  adverting  to  the  fact, 
that  if  the  charges  brought  against  General  Armstrong  were 
true,  he  deserved  instant  dismission,  and  if  false,  had  as  clearly 
a  right  to  a  firm,  unshaken  support,  he  gave  to  Mr.  McKenney, 
the  assurance  required. 

The  reader  can  now  easily  understand,  why  our  author  in  re 
lating,  for  the  benefit  of  his  dying  patron,  and  the  guidance  of 
future  historians,  this  tale  of  other  times,  should  have  carefully 
omitted  all  allusion  to  the  Georgetown  Committee, — to  the  secret 
closet  and  more  secret  conversation, — to  the  mental  struggles  of 
the  President,  and  the  mischievous  activity  of  General  Arm 
strong's  enemies.  These  things,  but  too  distinctly  indicated,  that 
a  plot  existed ;  and  it  became  necessary  to  sink  them  out  of  sight, 
and  represent  the  whole  business  as  springing  out  of  a  sudden  fit 
of  patriotic  indignation,  caused  by  General  Armstrong's  appear 
ance  on  Wind  Mill  Hill !  Who  could,  from  McKenney's  narra 
tive,  suppose,  that  he  was  in  this  matter  anything  more  than  the 
innocent  bearer  of  General  Smith's  message  ?  Who  coulfj.  dis 
cover  in  his  plausible  story,  the  fact,  that  for  three  days  he  had 
been  laboriously  engaged  in  defaming  a  man  who  was  not  pre 
sent  to  defend  himself?  Yet,  however  cunningly  the  fable  be 
devised,  one  fact  escapes  him  which  may  serve  to  guide  us 
to  a  right  conclusion,  with  respect  to  the  leading  motive  of  all 
this  dirty  villainy, — it  is,  the  message  so  pregnant  with  mean 
ing,  of  which  Mr.  McKenney  was  the  bearer :  "  Under  any 
other  member  of  the  Cabinet,  a  cheerful  and  ready  obedience 
will  be  rendered."  What  was  this  but  an  intimation  to  the  Presi 
dent,  that  Colonel  Monroe  was  expected  to  succeed  to  the  vacant 
place  ?  For  neither  Campbell,  nor  Jones,  nor  Rush,  could  have 
any  pretensions  to  fill  it.  It  was  virtually  telling  Mr.  Madison, 
"  It  would  not  suit  our  purpose,  were  you  to  seek  a  successor  to 
General  Armstrong  out  of  your  own  Cabinet ;  Mr.  Monroe  is 
the  man  for  whose  interests  we  have  labored." 

Political  intrigues  are  seldom  to  be  proved  by  direct  evidence  ; 
it  is  by  combining  circumstances,  trifling  when  taken  alone,  but 
quick  with  conviction  when  brought  together, — that  weakness 
becomes  strength,  and  darkness  light.  It  is  sufficient  to  show 
the  existence  of  an  end,  means  and  agents.  How  was  it  in  this 
case  ?  A  competitor  for  political  power  had  appeared,  whom  it 
was  necessary  to  jostle  out  of  Mr.  Monroe's  way :  this  was  the 
end.  Calumnies,  founded  on  the  capture  of  Washington,  and  in 
tended  to  deceive  the  people,  whilst  other  influences  were  em 
ployed  to  incite  the  President — such  were  the  means ;  and  as  for 


]2 

the  agents,  it  is  but  necessary  to  read  the  names  of  Smith,  Carrol, 
Mason,  Graham,  Bowie  and  McKenney,  to  be  fully  convinced  of 
their  ready  subserviency  to  the  interests  of  what  was  termed  in 
that  day, — the  Virginia  Dynasty. 

"  We  learned,  and  I  remember  we  confided  in  the  source  whence  we  derived 
our  information,  that  President  Madison  suggested  to  General  Armstrong,  in 
view  of  the  state  of  things  as  narrated,  whether  it  might  not  be  proper  for  him 
to  suspend  his  functions  as  War-minister  over  the  District  of  Columbia,  but  to 
exercise  them  elsewhere.  To  which  the  General  was  said  to  have  answered, 
'  he  would  be  Secretary  of  War  over  the  whole,  or  none.'  Mr.  Madison  re 
ceiving  this  as  an  inadmissible  alternative,  told  him  so,  when  General  Arm 
strong  ceased  to  be  Secretary  of  War." 

The  above  paragraph  contains  (with  one  exception)  a  suffi 
ciently  fair  account  of  what  passed  between  General  Armstrong 
and  Mr.  Madison.  The  source  of  McKenney's  information, 
(though  he  does  not  say  it)  was,  the  President  Hmself,  and  I 
acknowledge  this  the  more  readily,  as  it  will  justify  me  in  offer 
ing  what  may  be  new  to  the  present  generation  of  readers, — the 
Secretary's  letter  to  the  public  on  the  subject  of  his  resignation. 
This  simple,  manly  address  for  a  time  produced  its  intended 
effect  ;*  neither  the  President,  nor  any  of  his  friends,  ventured  to 
controvert  a  single  fact  stated  in  it.  But  the  calumnies  it  ex 
pose^,  continued  to  be  spoken  in  whispers,  and  no  effort  was  left 
untried  by  official  pimps  and  parasites,  to  turn  the  stream  of  pub 
lic  opinion  into  a  channel  unfavorable  to  the  War-minister.  The 
contest  between  an  individual  and  a  government  was  too  un 
equal  to  be  long  maintained,  particularly  when  that  individual,  not 
being  a  party  man,  could  not  claim  a  party  support ;  yet,  there 
were  a  select  few  whose  homage  and  respect  followed  General 
Armstrong  in  retirement,  and  among  them  men  whose  names 
rank  highest  in  the  military  annals  of  America.]  Those  who 

*  Extract  of  a  letter  from  Governor  Desha,  of  Kentucky,  to  General  Armstrong, 
dated  Washington,  September  26th,  1814. — "  Clamor  ran  high  against  you  here, 
but  from  the  effect  produced  by  a  letter  you  addressed  to  the  editors  of  the  Balti 
more  Patriot,  together  with  the  opinion  of  a  number  of  members  freely  expressed 
respecting  your  qualifications,  conduct  in  office,  &c.,  it  has  been  mersurably 
silenced.  Indeed,  I  have  heard  members  who  have  not  been  heretofore  well  dis 
posed  towards  you,  expres-s  a  wish  that  you  were  still  at  he  hea  i  of  the  War  De 
partment.  They  speak  freely  of  your  capacity  and  conduct  while  in  office.  They 
say  thrt  your  energy  was  invaluable  in  a  Cabinet  wh  ;re  indecision  and  a  disposi 
tion  for  temporising  have  been  the  order  of  the  day." 

f  The  General  was  no  collector  of  testimonials ;  what  he  left  among  his  papers 
of  this  character,  was  given  unsought,  and  perhaps,  not  estimated  by  him  at  its 
proper  value.  I  select  a  few  of  these  favorable  expressions  of  opinion  merely  to 
show,  that  the  assertion  in  the  text  is  not  made  without  good  reason. 

Extracts  from  letters  of  Major  General  Brown  to  his  brother  Major  Brown — 
"  Canandaijjua,  March  28th,  1814. — Armstrong  is  a  great  man,  who  with  a  single 
eye  to  the  public  good  has  pursued  the  honor  and  interests  of  the  army."  The 
same  to  the  same— "Fort  Erie,  September  13th,  1814. — It  is  reported  that  Sec 
retary  Armstrong  is  removed;  if  this  be  so,  it  is  a  great  misfortune.  Rely  upon 
it,  he  is  the  only  military  man  in  the  Cabinet."  The  same,  to  General  Armstrong. 


13 

were  most  capable  of  estimating  the  value  of  his  services,  were 
best  disposed  to  do  him  justice.  With  this  brief  preface,  I  pass 
to  the  letter  itself. 


"  It  may  be  due  to 'myself,  and  is  certainly  due  to  others,  that 
the  reasons  under  which  I  retired  from  the  direction  of  the  Wai- 
Department,  at  a  juncture  so  critical  as  the  present,  should  be 
fully  and  promptly  made  known  to  the  public.  These  reasons 
will  be  found  in  the  following  brief  exposition  of  facts. 

On  the  evening  of  the  29th  ultimo,  the  President  called  at  my 
lodgings  and  stated,  that  a  case  of  much  delicacy  had  occurred  ; 
that  a  high  degree  of  excitement  had  been  raised  among  the 
militia  of  Georgetown  and  the  city ;  that  he  was  himself  an  ob 
ject  of  their  suspicions  and  menaces  ;  that  an  officer  of  that  corps 
had  given  him  notice,  that  they  would  no  longer  obey  any  order 
coming  through  me  as  Secretary  of  War,  and  that  in  the 
urgency  of  the  case  it  might  be  proper,  so  far  to  yield  to  the  im 
pulse,  as  to  permit  some  other  person  to  exercise  my  functions  in 
relation  to  the  defence  of  Washington. 

"  To  this  statement  and  proposition  I  answered  substantially, — 
that  I  was  aware  of  the  excitement  to  which  he  alluded ;  that  I 
knew  its  source,  and  had  marked  its  progress  ;  that  it  was  not  a 
moment  to  examine  its  more  occult  causes,  objects,  and  agents  ; 


--"  It  is  a  source  of  great  gratification  for  me  to  know  that  my  conduct  is  by  you 
approved.  Popular  applause  is  very  well — it  is  not  to  be  despised,  nor  too  strongly 
coveted, — but  the  approbation  of  the  select  few,  who  have  the  means  and  the 
ability  to  judge,  has  higher  claims  ;  and  I  should  be  dead  to  all  honorable  feeling 
did  I  not  proudly  estimate  such  praise  as  you  can  bestow. — December  20th,  1814." 

Col.  Richard  M.  Johnson  to  General  Armstrong. —  "  January  19th,  1816,  Wash 
ington.  I  look  back  with  interest  to  the  time  when  you  composed  a  part  of  the 
Cabinet.  I  recollect  with  pleasure  the  decisive  character  of  your  measures  from 
which  so  much  good  resulted.  It  must  at  all  times  give  consolation  to  reflect,  that 
we  have  done  our  duty  in  the  mo-^t  difficult  and  trying  periods.  For  my  part,  I 
have  always  regretted  your  separation  from  us,  and  the  unfortunate  occurrences 
which  produced  it " 

General  Macomb  in  a  letter  of  the  19th  of  January,  1826,  forwarding  certain 
public  documents,  says  :  "  It  affords  me  great  pleasure  to  have  an  opportunity  of 
addressing  you,  and  of  assuring  you  that  my  attachment  to  your  person  and  esteem 
for  your  character  have  not  been  diminished  by  the  distance  in  space  and  time 
which  have  separated  us.  I  shall  be  ever  ready  to  testify  to  the  efficiency  of  your 
administration  in  the  War  Department,  as  laying  the  foundation  of  many  of  the 
most  valuable  attributes  now  possessed  by  the  army.  The  present  condition 
of  the  army,  which  has  been  the  result  of  labor  and  of  time,  is  highly  creditable 
to  those  who  have  taken  a  part  in  rendering  the  establishment  what  it  is,  and  a 
review  of  the  several  administrations  under  whose  guidance  it  has  been  trained, 
would  be  an  interesting  and  valuable  exhibit  to  the  nation  at  large. 

"  I  have  been  led  to  these  remarks  by  a  chain  of  associations  of  thought  referring 
to  our  military  connection,  and  the  more  I  reflect  on  the  part  you  took,  the  more  I 
feel  inclined  to  assure  you  of  the  homage  of  my  highest  consideration  and  esteem." 

To  these  names,  I  might  add  those  of  nearly  all  the  distinguished  men  of  the 
army  of  1812-13,  and  14.  And  the  reader  will  remark,  that  these  flattering  words 
were  not  employed  to  propitiate  the  successful  candidate  for  political  power  ;  but 
were  voluntary  expressions  of  regard  for  one  who,  in  retirement,  could  no  longer 
confer,  or  withhold  benefits. 


14 

that  it  ostensibly  rested  on  charges  known  to  himself  to  be  false  ; 
that  it  was  not  for  me  to  determine  how  far  the  supposed  urgency 
of  the  case  made  it  proper  for  him  to  yield  to  an  impulse  so  vile 
and  profligate — so  injurious  to  truth  and  so  destructive  of  order, 
but  that  for  myself  there  was  no  choice  ;  that  I  would  never  sur 
render  a  part  of  my  legitimate  authority  for  the  preservation  of 
the  rest ;  that  I  must  exercise  it  wholly  or  not  at  all ;  that  I  came 
into  office  with  objects  exclusively  public,  but  that  to  accommo 
date  myself  or  my  conduct  to  the  humors  of  a  village  mob,  stimu 
lated  by  faction  and  led   by  folly,  was  not  the  way  to  promote 
these,  and  that,  if  his  decision  was  taken  in   conformity  to  the 
suggestions  he  had  made,  I  entreated  him  to  accept  my  resigna 
tion.     This  he  declined  doing.     It  was  an  extent  he  was  pleased 
to  say,  to  which  he  meant  not  to  go  ;  that  he  knew  the  excitement 
was  limited  as  well  with  regard  to  time  as  to  place  ;  that  he  was 
now  and  had  always  been,  fully  sensible  of  the  general  zeal,  dili 
gence,  and  talent,  which  I  had  put  into  the  discharge  of  my  duty, 
and  that  it  would  give  him  pleasure,  were  I  to  take  time  to  con 
sider,  the  proposition  he  had  made.     I  renewed  the  assurance  of 
my  great  personal  respect,  and  my  readiness  to  conform  to  his 
wishes  on  all  proper  occasions.     I  remarked,  that  whatever  zeal, 
talent  and  knowledge  I  possessed,  had  been  employed  freely  but 
firmly,  and  according  to  my  best  views  of  the  public  good,"  and 
that  as  long  as  they  were  left  to  be  so  exerted,  they  were  at  the 
service  of  my  country — but  that  the  moment  they  were  required 
to  bow  to  military  usurpation,  or  political  faction,  there  should  be 
an  immediate  end   of  their  public  exercise.     We  now  parted, 
with  an  understanding  that  1  should  leave  Washington  the  fol 
lowing  morning.* 

*  That  Mr.  Madison  looked  forward  to  the  time,  when  they  should  again  form 
part  of  the  same  administration,  is  shown,  by  the  following  extracts  from  two  let 
ters,  written  by  General  Parker,  Chief  Clerk  of  the  War  Department,  the  evidence 
contained  in  which  is  confirmed  by  the  subsequent  testimony  of  Mr.  Jacob  Barker. 
The  first  letter  is  dated,  September  4th,  1814,  three  days  afterGeneral  Armstrong 
had  left  Washington,  and  before  the  appearance  of  his  address.  It  contained  these 
words:  "The  President  has  expressed  himself  highly  favorable  towards  you.  I 
expect  you  back  in  October."  The  second  bears  date,  "  May  20th,  1833— Your 
leaving'Washington  in  August,  1814,  and  subsequent  withdrawal  from  the  War 
Department,  has,  I  believe,  changed  our  whole  history  from  that  time.  Your 
movement  has  nowhere  that  I  have  seen  been  fully  explained  or  accounted  for. 
You  spoke  to  me  the  evening  before  you  left  only  of  making  a  visit  to  Baltimore,, 
and  the  next  day,  Mr.  Madison  stated  to  me,  that  it  had  been  deemed  advisable  to 
allow  your  temporary  absence, — that  we  should  go  on  with  the  War  Department 
as  before,  and  that  you  would  probably  return  before  the  meeting  of  Congress,  and 
resume  your  duties  as  Secretary  of  War." 

From  the  above  it  is  apparent,  that  the  President  had  awakened  to  a  sense  of 
the  great  weakness  he  had  betrayed  in  listening  to  the  suggestions  of  a  miserable 
faction,  and  would,  had  shame  permitted  it,  have  retraced  his  steps.  At  the  time 
of  General  Armstrong's  interview  with  him,  he  was  not  aware  of  the  fact  that  the 
President  had  that  very  morning  committed  himself  by  a  promise  to  the  George 
town  Committee.  This  he  learned  in  Baltimore,  and  immediately  determined  to 
resign.  Mr.  Barker  says  :— «« I  joined  him  at  Baltimore,  and  assured  him  from 


15 

'"  It  has  been  since  stated  to  me  as  a  fact  (to  which  I  give  the 
most  reluctant  credit)  that,  in  the  morning  of  the  29th,  and  be 
fore  my  arrival  in  the  city,  a  Committee  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Georgetown,  of  whom  Alexander  C.  Hanson,  the  reputed  editor 
of  the  Federal  Republican,  was  one,  had  waited  on  the  Presi 
dent  by  deputation,  and  obtained  from  him  a  promise,  that  I 
should  no  longer  direct  the  military  defences  of  the  District.  On 
this  fact,  comments  are  unnecessary. 

"I  now  proceed  to  exhibit,  and  to  answer  the  charges  raised 
against  me,  and  which  form  the  ground-work  of  that  excitement 
to  which  the  President  thought  it  prudent  to  sacrifice  his  au 
thority  in  declining  to  support  mine. 

"  1st.  That  I  gave  orders  for  the  retreat  of  the  army  in  the  ac- 
jon  of  the  24th  instant,  and  under  circumstances  not  making 
-.etreat  either  necessary  or  proper, 

"  This  charge  has  not  for  its  support  the  shadow  of  truth,  and  I 
appeal  to  the  President  himself,  whether  I  did  not,  by  his  request, 
take  a  position  which  rendered  it  impossible  for  me  to  have  given 
such  order.  From  this  position,  I  pointed  out  to  him  the  disorder 
tnd  retreat  of  the  first  line,  soon  after  the  action  began.* 

"  2d.  That  in  despite  of  the  remonstrances  of  General  Winder, 
Tdid,  by  the  interposition  of  my  authority,  prevent  him  from  de 
fending  the  Capitol. 

"  This  charge  contains  in  it  a  total  perversion  of  the  truth. 
vVhen  the  head  of  the  retiring  column  reached  the  Capitol  it  was 
naked  for  a  moment.  General  Winder  took  this  occasion  to 
state  to  Colonel  Monroe  and  myself,  that  he  was  not  in  a  condi 
tion  to  maintain  another  combat,  and  that  his  force  was  broken 
down  by  fatigue  and  dispersion.  Under  this  representation, 
Colonel  Monroe  proposed,  that  he  should  occupy  the  heights  in 
the  rear  of  Georgetown,  and  in  this  opinion,  I  united. f 

the  President,  that  he  expected  him  back  as  Chief  of  the  War  Department  in  two 
or  three  weeks,  and  would  assuredly  support  him  therein.  General  Armstrong's 
reply  was — '  My  determination  is  taken — here  are  my  [written]  reasons — they 
will  appear  in  print,  if  a  newspaper  can  be  found  free  enough  to  publish  them.' " 
Jacob  Barker's  letter  to  the  editor  of  the  Commercial  Advertiser,  May  20th,  1843. 

*  The  truth  of  this  assertion  is  proved  by  Mr.  Monroe's  letter  to  the  Investigat 
ing  Committee,  from  which  I  make  the  following  extract:  "After  some  pause, 
the  President  remarked  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  myself,  that  it  would  be  proper 
for  us  to  retire  to  the  rear,  leaving  the  military  movement  to  military  men, 
which  we  did." — P.  69  of  the  Report  of  the  Committee. 

f  That  General  Winder  made  no  remonstrance,  and  did  not  wish  to  defend  the 
Capitol  is  proved,  by  the  following  extract  from  his  Narrative  [p.  168,  Report  of 
Committee].  "In  a  few  moments,  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Secretary  of 
War  joined  me;  besides  that,  they  had  been  witnesses  to  the  dispersion  of  the 
troops,  and  the  exhaustion  of  those  just  halted  by  me,  I  stated  the  diminution  of 
my  force,  and  the  extent  of  the  positions  which  rendered  it  impossible  for  me  to 
place  the  force  1  then  had  in  such  a  position,  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  taking 
me  on  the  flank  as  well  as  the  front,  and  that  no  reasonable  hope  could  be  enter^ 
tained,  that  we  had  any  troops  who  could  be  relied  on  to  make  a  resistance  as  des 
perate  as  necessary,  in  an  isolated  building,  which  could  not  be  supported  by  a  suf- 


16 

"  3d.  That  I  had  withdrawn  the  covering  party  from  the  rear 
of  Fort  Washington,  arid  had  ordered  the  fort  to  be  blown  up 
and  all  obstruction  to  the  passage  of  the  Potomac  abandoned, 
without  firing  a  gun. 

"  This  charge  is  utterly  void  of  truth.  The  covering  party  was 
withdrawn  by  an  order  from  General  Winder,  and  Captain  Dy 
son's  official  report  shows,  that  the  orders  under  which  he  acted 
were  derived  from  the  same  source — though  no  doubt  mistaken, 
or  misrepresented.* 

"  4th.  That  by  my  orders  the  Navy  Yard  was  burned. 

*'  This,  like  its  predecessors,  is  a  positive  falsehood.  I  sent  an 
aide  to  apprise  Commodore  Tinge y  that  the  army  was  retiring, 
and  would  no  longer  be  able  to  cover  his  establishment.  He 
was  thus  left  to  follow  the  suggestions  of  his  own  mind,  or  to 
obey  those  of  the  Head  of  the  Navy  Department.f 

"  5th  and  lastly,  that  means  had  not  been  taken  to  collect  a 
force  sufficient  for  the  occasion.  Under  this  head,  as  the  subject 
will  probably  become  one  of  legislative  inquiry,  I  shall  at  pre 
sent  make  but  two  remarks  : 

"  1st.  That  no  means  within  reach  of  the  Government  had 
been  omitted  or  withheld;  that  a  separate  military  district  em 
bracing  the  seat  of  Government  had  been  created  ;  that  an  offi 
cer  of  high  rank  and  character  had  been  called  to  take  charge 
of  it ;  that  to  him  was  given  authority  to  call  for  supplies  and  a 
militia  force  of  fifteen  thousand  men,  to  which  might  be  added 
the  36th  regiment  of  the  line,  a  battalion  of  the  38th,  detachments 
of  the  12th,  of  the  artillery  and  dragoons,  and  the  flotilla  crews 
and  Marine  corps  under  Commodore  Barney,  making  a  total  of 
sixteen  thousand  three  hundred  men.  General  Winder's  official 
report  shows,  how  much  of  this  force  was  actually  assembled, 
and  the  causes  why  a  greater  part  of  it  had  not  been  brought 

ficiency  of  troops  from  without."  Mr.  Monroe's  agency  in  the  retreat  from  Wash 
ington  is  proved  by  the  following  extract  from  his  letter  :  "  We  both  advised  the 
General  to  rally  and  form  [the  army]  on  the  heights  above  Georgetown,  believing, 
as  I  did,  that  much  would  be  hazarded  by  an  attempt  near  the  Capitol." 

*  That  the  covering  force  was  withdrawn  by  an  order  from  General  Winder,  is 
proved  by  the  following  extract  from  the  letter  of  Brigadier  Young  :  "  General 
Winder  despatched  the  trooper  back  writh  verbal  orders  for  my  brigade  to  cross  the 
Potomac,  and  form  a  junction  with  his  army  in  Montgomery  County,  Maryland. 
1  accordingly  crossed  the  troops  over  to  Alexandria,  on  the  night  of  the  24th  of 
August."  That  the  fort  was  blown  up  under  a  mistaken  view  of  General  Winder's 
order,  is  shown  by  his  own  Narrative,  p.  174  of  the  Report  of  the  Committee.  "  I 
sent  by  Major  Kite,  directions  to  the  commanding  officer  at  Fort  Washington,  in 
the  event  of  his  being  taken  in  the  rear  by  the  enemy,  to  blow  up  the  fort,  and 
retire  across  the  river." 

f  The  facts  stated  above  are  proved  by  the  following  extract  of  a  letter  from. 
Commodore  Tingey  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  : — "  After  receiving  your  orders 
of  the  24th,  directing  the  public  shipping,  stores,  &c.,  at  this  establishment  to  be 
destroyed  in  case  of  the  success  of  the  enemy  over  our  army,  no  time  was  lost  in 
making  the  necessary  arrangements  for  firing  the  whole,  &c.  About  4  P.M.,  I  re 
ceived  a  message  by  an  officer,  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  with  information  that 
he  could  protect  me  no  longer."— P.  277,  Report  of  the  Committee. 


17 

» 

together — causes,  altogether  extraneous,  and  beyond  the  control 
of  the  National  Government.* 

"  2d.  From  what  is  now  known  of  the  enemy's  force,  of  the 
Joss  he  sustained  in  the  enterprise,  and  of  the  precipitancy  of  his 
retreat,  it  is  obvious  that  if  all  the  troops  assembled  at  Bladens- 
burg  had  been  faithful  to  themselves,  their  number  was  fully  compe 
tent  to  have  beaten  the  enemy,  and  to  have  saved  the  Capitol."t 

I  know  with  what  reluctance  the  generality  of  readers  turn 
from  the  text,  to  examine  notes ;  yet,  1  cannot  but  beseech  those 
who  feel  an  interest  in  the  truth  of  history,  not  to  pass,  unatten- 
tively,  the  extracts  I  have  made  from  public  documents.  A 
close  examination  of  these  will  show,  that  every  assertion  set 
forth  in  the  above  nervous  production  was  proved  true  by  subse 
quent  evidence  before  the  Investigating  Committee.  But,  let  us 
return  to  the  subject  under  review. 

"  This,"  said  Mr.  Monroe,  "  is  all  that  I  want.  It  exonerates  me  from  the 
charge  of  having  undermined  General  Armstrong  by  any  agency  of  mine.  So 
far  as  the  facts  were  made  known  to  me  at  the  time,  you  state  them  correctly  ; 
and  the  rest  I  have  had  from  other  sources  since,  and  they  corroborate  what  you 
say."  I  promised  to  write  out  the  narrative  as  requested,  and  did  so.  Mr.  Mon 
roe  died  a  few  days  after  this  interview,  and  with  him  the  demand  fora  forth 
coming  of  the  facts." 

With  more  of  success  than  Macbeth's  Apothecary,  Doctor  Mc- 
Kenney  seems  to  have  discovered  the  art  of  "  ministering  to  a 

*  Provedby  the  following  quotation  from  the  Report  of  the  Investigating  Com 
mittee,  pp.  37 — 8.  "  On  the  2d  of  July,  the  tenth  military  district  was  consti 
tuted,  and  the  command  given  to  General  Winder.  On  the  4th,  the  requisition 
upon  the  States  for  93,500  men  was  made.  On  the  14th,  the  Governors  of  Penn 
sylvania  and  Virginia  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  the  requisition,  and  promised 
promptitude.  About  the  10th,  the  Governor  of  Maryland  was  served  with  a  requi 
sition,  and  took  measures  to  designate  a  corps  of  six  thousand  men — the  whole 
quota  from  that  State.  On  the  12th,  General  Winder  was  authorized,  in  case  of 
menaced  or  actual  invasion,  to  call  into  service  the  whole  quota  of  Maryland. 
On  the  17th,  the  General  was  farther  authorized  to  call  into  actual  service  not  loss 
than  two  nor  more  than  three  thousand  of  the  drafts  assigned  to  his  command,  to 
form  a  permanent  force,  to  be  stationed  in  some  central  position  between  Baltimore 
and  the  City  of  Washington.  On  the  same  day,  he  was  authorized  to  call  on  the 
State  of  Pennsylvania  for  five  thousand,  on  Virginia  for  two  thousand,  on  the  mi 
litia  of  the  District  of  Columbia  for  two  thousand,  together  with  the  six  thousand 
from  Maryland,  making  an  aggregate  force  of  fifteen  thousand  drafted  militia  ; 
three  thousand  of  which,  authorized  to  be  called  in  actual  service  (the  residue  in 
case  of  actual  or  menaced  invasion),  besides  the  regular  troops  estimated  at  one 
thousand,  making  sixteen  thousand,  independent  of  marines  and  flotilla  men. 
This  was  the  measure  of  defence  contemplated  for  military  district  No.  10,  and  the 
measures  taken  by  the  War  Department  up  to  the  11  th  of  July  in  execution  of 
it"  Five  weeks  before  the  enemy's  attack  on  Washington,  General  Armstrong 
had  fulfilled  his  duty. 

f  The  force  actually  assembled  by  Gen.  Winder,  amounted  to  upwards  of  six 
thousand  fivre  hundred  men  of  all  arras,  and  twenty  pieces  of  artillery.  It  was 
attacked  and  routed  in  twenty  minutes  by  the  advance  guard  of  the  British  army, 
consisting  of  fifteen  hundred  men.  The  severity  of  the  engagement  may  be  esti 
mated  by  the  greatness. of  the  American  loss,  ten  killed,  and  thirty  wounded  ! 

3 


,    . 

mind  diseased."  The  dose  prescribed  by  him,  with  such  signal 
effect,  consisted  of  one  grain  of  truth,  mixed  with  ninety-nine  of 
fiction,  and,  unlike  medicines  in  general,  appears  to  have  been 
equally  well  suited  to  the  disorder,  and  the  palate  of  the  patient. 
Yet,  I  may  be  permitted  to  ask,  how  it  happened,  that  President 
Monroe  should  have  suffered  the  moral  cancer  gnawing  at  his 
vitals  for  so  many  years,  when  this  convenient  friend  was  ever 
at  hand  to  administer  a  cheap  and  effectual  remedy  ?  Had  the 
brightness  of  Mr.  McKenneys  memory  suffered  a  temporary 
eclipse  ?  Were  the  facts  which  now  fall  so  glibly  from  his  pen, 
lost  for  a  time  amid  the  maze  of  Indian  accounts  and  disburse 
ments  ?  Or,  am  I  to  believe,  what  I  confess  seems  to  me  most 
probable,  that  when  he  represents  his  friend  and  patron  as  suffer 
ing  for  years  from  the  dread  of  posthumous  condemnation,  he 
paints  with  a  brush  too  thick,  and  a  coloring  too  high  ?  There 
is  also  something  equivocal  in  the  expression  of  Mr.  Monroe's 
satisfaction.  "  This,"  he  says,  "  is  all  that  I  want.  It  exonerates 
me  from  the  charge  of  having  undermined  General  Armstrong, 
by  any  agency  of  mine"  Had  he  said, " by  any  agency  of 
others,"  notwithstanding  the  solemnity  of  the  occasion,  McKen- 
ney  must  have  laughed  in  his  face. 

But  why  publish  this  defence,  since  the  contingency  has  not 
happened,  on  which  the  Ex-President  founded  his  request  for  its 
appearance  ?  Like  Mr.  Monroe,  General  Armstrong  has  done 
with  this  world,  and  his  latest  and  best  work  is  not  disfigured  by 
any  allusion  to  personal  wrongs,  which  he  despised  too  much  to 
feel  very  deeply.  The  foregoing  question  admits  but  of  one 
reply :  though  the  injured  party  could  forget  and  forgive,  his 
enemies  (of  whom  our  author  is  one)  have  more  memory  and 
less  charity.  Not  contented  with  temporary  success,  they  seek, 
as  far  as  practicable,  to  mislead  future  inquiry,  and  stamp  their 
falsehoods  on  the  record  of  the  past.  There  is  also  in  Mr.  Mc- 
Kenney  an  affectation  of  candor,  which,  if  possible,  renders  his 
conduct  more  reprehensible.  This  is,  especially  evinced  in  the 
last  paragraph  of  the  chapter,  which  has  been  the  subject  of 
notice.  It  is  as  follows  : 

"  The  charge  of  traitor,  which  was  lavishly  employed  against  General  Arm 
strong,  I  never  believed.  His  whole  fault  lay  in  a  total  absence  of  faith  in  the 
intention  of  the  British  to  attack  Washington.  And,  indeed,  the  act  struck 
every  military  mind  then  as  it  does  now,  as  one  of  the  most  unexampled  teme 
rity.  An  incursion,  such  as  was  made  into  a  country  densely  peopled,  without 
artillery  or  cavalry,  exposing  both  flank  and  rear  to  the  capacity  of  such  a  city 
as  Baltimore,  was  one  of  that  kind  of  onsets  which  secures  success  only  by  the 
general  apathy  arising  out  of  the  belief  that  nothing  so  desperate  would  be  at 
tempted." 

Without  being  as  sceptical  as  the  renowned  Walter,  the 
Doubter,  Mr.  Thomas  L.  McKenney  may  well  avow  his  disbe- 


19 

| 

lief  of  a  charge  so  false  and  foolish,  as  to  have  found  credence 
and  circulation  only  among  the  dregs  of  a  militia  carnp.  Trea 
son  !  why,  the  foul  suspicion  was  never  breathed  in  any  circle  of 
honest  men  ;  and  the  admission  that  he  heard  it,  is  a  damning 
proof  of  the  filthiness  of  his  associations  at  that  period.  As  for 
the  "  total  want  of  faith"  ascribed  by  Mr.  McKenney,  to  General 
Armstrong,  I  have  already  shown  to  the 'satisfaction  of  every 
unprejudiced  mind,  that  it  consisted  only  in  a  reasonable,  well- 
founded  doubt  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  enemy  ;  and  this,  too, 
at  a  time  when  nothing  short  of  omniscience  itself  could  have 
sufficed  to  determine  what  those  intentions  were,  or  rather,  what 
they  would  be,  for  they  shifted  (as  is  proved  by  British  authori 
ties)  with  every  incident  of  the  march.*  Again :  It  will  not  es 
cape  the  reader's  observation,  that  with  a  logic  as  defective  as 
his  memory,  Mr.  McKenney.  in  this  closing  paragraph,  imputes 
to  General  Armstrong,  the  serious  fault  of  sharing  in  an  opinion 
which  it  seems  was  held  by  the  whole  community  ;  since,  accord 
ing  to  our  author,  the  success  of  the  British  attack  on  Washing 
ton  was  occasioned,  "  solely  by  the  general  apathy,  arising  out  ot 
a  'belief  that  nothing  so  desperate  would  be  attempted." 

Is  it  not  a  fair  inference,  that  if  '-general  apathy"  was  alone 
to  blame  for  this  capital  misfortune,  General  Armstrong  was 
treated  with  much  injustice  ?  And  to  what,  after  all,  amounts 
this  charge  against  him  of  incredulity  with  regard  to  the  enemy's 
intentions  ?  Granting  it  to  be  true,  in  its  fullest  extent,  it  is 
without  force,  unless  it  be  shown  that  this  "  want  of  faith"  was 
productive  of  other  and  greater  wants?  So  self-evident  is  this 
proposition,  that  the  censurers  of  the  War  minister  have,  from  that 
day  to  this,  made  "neglected  preparation"  the  burthen  of  their 
song :  yet  on  this  head  I  stand  armed  with  the  decision  of  seven 
gentlemen,  distinguished  alike  for  character  and  talent,  who,  after 
a  long  and  laborious  investigation,  in  which  they  sought  and  in 
vited  whatever  evidence  could  be  procured,  came  to  the  unani 
mous  conclusion,  that  the  President's  plan  of  defence  was  put  in 
full  execution  as  far  as  the  Secretary  of  War  could  execute  it, 
five  weeks  before  the  enemy's  attack,  f 


*  "  We  remained  during  the  night  at  Nottingham,  nor  were  we  as  usual  early  in 
motion  in  the  morning,  and  hesitation  had  taken  place  as  to  the  course  to  be  pur 
sued,  whether  to  follow  the  gun-boats,  or  return  to  the  shipping." — Campaign  at 
Washington,  p.  117.  Again :  "  The  truth  is,  the  capture  of  Washington  was 
not  the  original  end  of  the  expedition.  To  destroy  the  flotilla  was  the  sole  ob 
ject  of  the  debarkation ;  and  but  for  the  instigations  of  Admiral  Cockburn,  who 
accompanied  the  army,  the  Capital  of  America  would  have  escaped  our  visitation." 
P. 152. 

f  The  members  of  the  Committee  of  Investigation  were  Johnson  of  Kentucky, 
Lowndes  of  South  Carolina,  Stockton  of  New  Jersey,  Miller  of  New  York,  Golds* 
borough  of  Maryland,  Barbour  of  Virginia,  and  Pickens  of  North  Carolina— /our 
Federalists  and  three  Republicans. 


20 

t 

As  respects  the  management  of  the  troops  in  the  field,  Gene 
ral  Armstrong  neither  had,  nor  could  have  anything  to  do  with 
it.  On  the  13th  of  August  he  had  been  served  by  the  President, 
with  the  following  rule :  "  No  order  shall  be  issued  by  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  to  any  officer  commanding  a  district,  relative  to 
military  movements,  without  previously  receiving  the  Executive 
sanction."  Understanding  this  as  an  intimation  that  General 
Winder  should  be  left  free  and  unshackled,  to  form  and  execute 
his  own  plans  on  his  own  responsibility,  the  War-Minister 
limited  his  interference  to  mere  advice,  given  only  when  re 
quested  by  the  General.  What  that  advice  wras  has  alreaSy  been 
shown,  and  little  doubt  can  now  exist,  that  if  it  had  been 
adopted,  it  would  probably  have  saved  the  city  from  capture,  or 
at  all  events,  have  surrounded  its  fall  by  such  circumstances  of 
glorious  resistance,  as  would  have  made  the  loss  of  their  capital 
an  event  to  be  spoken  of  by  Americans,  without  a  blush.* 

But  some  curious  inquirer  may  ask  ; — If  publi ;  opinion,  mis 
led  by  faction  and  falsehood,  has  hitherto  condemned  the  inno 
cent,  can  you  furnish  the  means  of  rectifying  the  mistake  by 
pointing  out  the  guilty  ?  A  full  answer  to  this  question  would 
necessarily  require  much  time  and  labor  and  research :  suffice  it 
to  say,  that  when  Mr.  McKenney  spoke  of  the  **  public  apathy," 
he  but  stated  one  of  the  leading  causes  of  the  disaster.  "  I  re 
ported  to  the  General,"  says  McClane,  "  that  the  people  between 
the  rivers  had  not  appeared  disposed  to  fight ;  it  was  common  to 
see  before  the  houses  a  pole  with  a  white  cloth  attached,  as  a  sig 
nal  of  submission"^  Certain  it  is,  that  with  such  materials  as 
that  portion  of  the  country  afforded,  the  formation  of  an  efficient 
army  was  no  easy  task  ;  nor  is  it  to  be  wondered  at,  that  many  of 
Winder's  battalions,  when  set  in  opposition  to  a  small  but 
well-disciplined  corps,  should  have  suffered  "  the  love  of  life  to 
prevail,  over  the  love  of  country  and  of  honor." 


*  The  advice  offered  by  General  Armstrong  to  General  Winder  and  the  Presi 
dent  may  be  thus  recapitulated  : 

1st.  Harass  the  enemy  on  his  march  by  front  and  flank  attacks. 

2d.  Let  Barney  defend  his  flotilla  against  the  enemy's  boats,  if  the  position  he 
has  taken  is  susceptible  of  defence. 

3d.  Fight  your  decisive  battle,  not  in  the  open  field,  but  in  and  about  the  Capi 
tol,  where  your  militia  will  have  tl  e  benefit  of  cover. 

f  McClane  Papers,  His.  Soc.  N.  Y. 


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